



My task is to comment on the fundamentals of negotiating industrial coop-
eration agreements. I would now like to share with you some of my experiences.
Within the context of negotiating industrial cooperation agreements, I would
define and characterize negotiating as identifying and defining the complex
elements of reciprocity embedded in a major industrial undertaking, and, on
this basis, forging an instrument of negotiated consensus despite legal dispar-
ities inherent in a transaction between capitalist and socialist legal systems, with
the goal of structuring a complex system of intertwined agreements reflecting
economic interreaction and interdependence of the parties. This is not a matter
of negotiating a simple contract, but rather a process in which rights and obliga-
tions shift over a period of time and specific factors change so that economic
equilibrium can be maintained, restored and redressed when necessary.
I will draw now on my client's experience, so you will hear an industrial point
of view of a highly technology-oriented producer in the petrochemical area.
Although the ingredients of a major cooperative agreement have been
enumerated, I will try to do it again my way. The ingredients could probably be,
at least the way I see them, manufacturing projects for production, transfer or
exchange of technology, joint capacity planning, supply and availability of raw
materials, management, finance, and other factors such as plant site, infra-
structure, and utilities.
These ingredients are the very fundamental economic premises on which the
project is predicated, and whose interreaction and interrelation form what I call
the fabric of the cooperative undertaking. The interplay of related basic
functions such as joint planning, co-production, joint research, and exchange of
technology, cross-supply of feed stocks, constitute the so-called dynamics of the
undertaking.
The dynamics produce and must maintain a flawless balance, an economic
equilibrium, a regulated modicum of economic interaction, inextricably linked.
We will come back to this point later. It is in this interdependence that we have
perhaps the strongest basis of enforceability of the undertaking or the protec-
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tion that your client seeks.
These very elements, ingredients and commitments related thereto should be
reflected in strong and clear representations at the beginning of the agreement.
They are essential for the creation of a sense of order in the undertaking. These
representations should be drafted and placed before the operative clauses of
your agreement.
I will illustrate with an authentic, multi-hundred million dollar project in
which I was engaged.
This petrochemical complex includes facilities for production of diverse
monomers, plastics and hydrocarbons, and will revolve around a 400,000 metric
unit ethylene plant. The complex will be based on the client's technology. The
site was chosen on the Adriatic next to large refineries, which provide the
essential feed stocks at the starting point of a projected 400-mile pipeline to be
built by the Yugoslavs, Czechoslovakia, and I think Hungary, one-third of the
cost of which pipeline will be financed by Kuwait. The complex will have at least
a dozen interrelated plants, each providing adequate feed stocks to each other.
It will be built itself in interdependence with the international bases in Western
Europe, which will supply feed stocks to the complex in Yugoslavia or on the
Adriatic. The production from these plants will serve the Yugoslav industries,
but also some of the client's Western European requirements.
All this results in a concrete, permanent interlocking of the complex with
Western economies and among the Eastern European participants. Now,
having linked all these parties together in this manner, we may have achieved
what I call a modicum of economic interaction, legally, inextricably linked, so
that the default or non-performance would bring about an imbalance which
should trigger an automatic sanction against the defaulting party.
Mr. Pisar has talked about the fluid and dynamic environment as the first
challenge to us lawyers, wherein the dogma of the state sovereignty of a socialist
legal economic system has to be faced, where the sources of raw material, the
essential instruments of production, distribution, and other institutions related
thereto are the exclusive jurisdiction of the state. Except for the U.S.S.R.,
Eastern European Socialist countries seem to give signs of more flexibility in
blending their interest in trade, industry and technology into business organiza-
tions of one sort or another which may provide some independence from the grip
of the Socialist state structure. With some ingenuity the theory that there shall
be no private enterprise can be circumvented with respect to a particular
industrial project.
Your client may want to acquire a vested interest and may be entitled to seek
an interest in the business organization where his technology is used in some
form of participation, at least such as a vested interest in a percentage of the
production, or a secured source of raw materials.
Your objective is to forge a consensus, despite deep disparities and dissimilar
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backgrounds of the respective partners or associates, overcoming obstacles and
barriers by reducing, to the extent possible, every issue to a negotiable, non-
ideological middle point, and fit all this into a coherent juridical pattern.
For example, there is no point in arguing whether there is private property,
whether the land where the plant is going to be established could be owned by
an independent business enterprise. It must belong to the state.
You are facing now, in a different environment, a situation where your
opposite number may be inclined from time to time to subordinate primary
economic reasons to other considerations that appear alien to you or not
germane to the subject matter.
Somebody asked, "Which language are you going to use?" I could refer to
one only if you asked me that question, and I am referring to a common-sense
language that will enhance the parties' ability to find that common ground of
interest and principles that will bridge the gap between such basically dissimilar
legal systems. In other words, I am talking about an economic, business or legal
language of common sense, based upon an understanding of the different
culture involved. I am not talking about whether you speak Romanian or
Hungarian.
Now, once you have armed yourself with the correct mental attitude and are
ready to draft and negotiate, the first fundamental issue is to properly identify
your opposite in the negotiations, to assess his negotiating authority and bar-
gaining powers and to ascertain, if possible, the various entities involved in the
implementation of the provisions of the main or primary agreement that you are
negotiating. In addition to the primary agreement, there will be separate agree-
ments that will be a reflection of the primary agreement. In any event, you are
faced with a state instrumentality, whether ministry, state agency, or political
subdivision. Although the subsidiary agreements may be executed by a state
enterprise that could be deemed to be a separate legal entity, as far as I am
concerned you are really dealing with a sovereign power, with all the inherent
problems of state jurisdiction and sovereign immunity this entails.
You prospective partner has considerable bargaining power, which rests
basically on the sovereign control over natural resources and over entry of the
foreign firm in the local market. On the other hand, your partner's bargaining
power is impeded or is encumbered by constraints of the sovereign state,
impeding your opposite number or its negotiator from departing from certain
conventional, legal and other norms. This brings inexorably into focus the
responsibility of the state as a major issue of the negotiations within the context
of sovereign powers, and of it, the sovereign state, ratifying in one form or
another, in a legally binding form if possible, any transaction you may enter
into. In my view, quite a variety of solutions are possible if the state policy
dictates their acceptance.
Now you have gotten to the "whereas" clauses, where I think should be
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written the very fundamental economic premises on which the ultimate
agreement or transaction is predicated. The motivations, guiding principles and
ultimate intent must be clearly spelled out and reflected in a set of clearly
defined representations set out before the operative clauses or verbose boiler-
plate which is so common in the Western world.
In most instances, you will want to agree to sign a preliminary agreement or
letter of understanding or protocol which would spell out intent, consideration,
premise and principles; and then other more inclusive instruments covering in
detail the whole spectrum of the transactions could be negotiated. You have, in
other words, hopefully structured a set of agreements with the inherent capacity
to produce a sense of order in the long run and a tolerable degree of predict-
ability.
The economic equilibrium, the negotiated quid pro quos, should be the
superior governing, permeating norm of the instrument. The instrument should
be normative to the extent possible in structure and prescriptive in pattern, and
then the balance of equal and permanent economic interdependence should be
written in so that the set of reciprocal respective considerations can withstand
the vicissitudes of change.
I would complete these remarks by saying again that there is room for
creativity, there is room for innovation, as long as the parties achieve a
modicum of economic interaction inextricably linked, so that any imbalance
resulting from one party's non-performance could be redressed, not by recourse
to a court of arbitration, but by virtue of your bargaining situation.
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